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Abstract
We investigate the cost of legal restrictions on experience rating in auto and home
insurance. The cost is an opportunity cost as experience rating can mitigate the prob-
lems associated with unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk, including mispriced cov-
erage and resulting demand distortions. We assess this cost through a counterfactual
analysis in which we explore how risk predictions, premiums, and demand in home
insurance and two lines of auto insurance would respond to unrestricted multiline ex-
perience rating. Using claims data from a large sample of households, we rst estimate
the variance-covariance matrix of unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk. We then
show that conditioning on claims experience leads to material renements of predicted
claim rates. Lastly, we assess how the householdsdemand for coverage would respond
to multiline experience rating. We nd that the demand response would be large.
Corresponding author: Joshua C. Teitelbaum, Georgetown University Law Center, 600 New Jersey
Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001 (jct48@law.georgetown.edu). We acknowledge nancial support from
National Science Foundation grant SES-1031136. Molinari also acknowledges nancial support from NSF
grant SES-0922330. This paper is released to inform interested parties of research and to encourage discus-
sion. The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Census Bureau.
1 Introduction
In many insurance markets, there are variables that a¤ect an insureds claim risk but are not
observable by the insurer.1 In other words, there is unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk.
The problem with unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk is that it can lead to mispriced
insurance, which in turn can impair the e¢ cient operation of insurance markets, including
by distorting the demand for insurance coverage.
In theory, an insurer can mitigate these problems through experience rating. The logic
is straightforward. Even if there is unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk at the time the
insurer underwrites and rates an insureds policy, the insurer subsequently receives signals
about the insureds latent risk type. In particular, the insurer observes the insureds claims
experience. By conditioning on the insureds claims experience, the insurer can rene its
initial prediction about the insureds claim risk, which is based solely on observables. The
insurer can then use its rened prediction to adjust or experience rate the insureds pre-
mium to better reect her true claim risk.2
In practice, however, U.S. law frequently imposes restrictions on an insurers ability
to engage in experience rating.3 An example from federal law is the A¤ordable Care Acts
community rating provisions, which forbid experience rating of premiums for heath insurance
coverage o¤ered in the individual or small group market.4 A state law example is New Yorks
Insurance Law, which forbids experience rating of premiums for auto comprehensive or home
1Alternatively, there may be variables that are observable by the insurer but that the insurer is prohibited
from using when it underwrites or rates the insureds policy (Salanié 1997; Avraham et al. 2014).
2Experience rating is not to be confused with classication rating. Under classication rating, an insureds
premium is based on the collective loss experience of all insureds in the insureds risk class. Under experience
rating, by contrast, an insureds premium is adjusted based on her individual loss experience.
3Advocates for legal restrictions on experience rating (and other forms of risk classication) generally rely
on arguments from equity (distributional and deontological) (e.g., Abraham 1985; Avraham et al. 2014). For
instance, they argue that such restrictions promote access to insurance for high-risk, low-income insureds
(e.g., Meier 1991; Thiery & Van Schoubroeck 2006; Thomas 2007; Dionne & Rothschild 2014). That said,
many consider e¢ ciency questions as well (e.g., Abraham 1985; Avraham et al. 2014; Dionne & Rothschild
2014; Abraham & Chiappori 2015).
4See Patient Protection and A¤ordable Care Act § 2701, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2018).
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insurance coverage and also prohibits using auto comprehensive claims to experience rate
premiums in any other line of insurance coverage.5
In this paper, we empirically investigate the cost of legal restrictions on experience rating
in the context of auto and home insurance. The cost is an opportunity cost. As noted
above, experience rating has the potential to mitigate the problems associated with unob-
served heterogeneity in claim risk. When the law imposes restrictions on experience rating,
insurers lose the opportunity to fully utilize their insuredsclaims experience to rene their
risk predictions and adjust their premiums to better reect the true risks. We assess this
opportunity cost through a counterfactual analysis in which we explore how risk predictions,
premiums, and demand in two lines of auto coverage and one line of home coverage would
respond to unrestricted experience rating within and across the three lines of coverage.
Our data comprise an unbalanced panel of 62,425 households who purchased auto and
home policies from a single insurance company between 1998 and 2006. Among other things,
the data record the number of claims led by each household in three lines of coverage: auto
collision, auto comprehensive, and home all perils. In addition, the data contain detailed
information about the households and their auto and home policies.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we use the data to estimate the variance-
covariance matrix  of unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk and to generate the house-
holdspredicted claim rates based on observables. We model householdsclaim counts using
a Poisson mixture model with correlated random e¤ects. To estimate the model, we take
a moments-based approach that uses generalized estimating equations based on marginal
moments (Morris 2012). Unlike the standard approach maximum likelihood estimation of
a parametric mixture of Poisson distributions our estimation approach is semiparametric
and unconstrained with respect to the parameters of the mixing distribution (Pinquet 2013).
Among other things, the estimates reveal that unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk is
positively correlated across lines of coverage.
5See N.Y. Ins. Law § 2334 (2018); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regis. tit. 11, §§ 161.8 & 169.1 (2018).
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Next, we demonstrate the value of the information contained in b and, by implication,
the value of the signals provided by the householdsclaims histories by showing that con-
ditioning on claims experience leads to material renements of the householdspredicted
claim rates. For instance, we nd that (i) among households with downward revisions, their
predicted claim rates decrease on average by 7 percent in auto collision, 13 percent in auto
comprehensive, and 14 percent in home and (ii) among households with upward revisions,
their predicted claim rates increase on average by 10 percent in auto collision, 23 percent in
auto comprehensive, and 28 percent in home. We also demonstrate the incremental value of
conditioning across lines of coverage (in addition to conditioning within lines of coverage).
Finally, we investigate the extent to which the householdsdemand for coverage, as cap-
tured by their deductible choices, would respond to experience rating within and across lines
of coverage (i.e., uniline and multiline experience rating). In so doing, we obtain a lower
bound on the potential for unpriced heterogeneity in claim risk to distort demand. Our
experience rating scheme is a simple bonus-malus system under which changes in premiums
are proportional to changes in predicted claim risk. We model householdsdeductible choices
according to standard expected utility theory. After calibrating the model with the risk aver-
sion estimate reported by Barseghyan et al. (2013), we use the model to generate deductible
choices for the households in our data assuming rst that premiums are not experience rated
and then that they are experience rated. We nd that there would be large responses to
experience rating. In particular, we nd that the fraction of households that would change
deductibles if premiums were experience rated is 7 percent in auto collision, 21 percent in
auto comprehensive, and 15 percent in home, resulting in average changes in coverage of
$247, $178, and $347, respectively, among policies with a change.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3
describes our data. Section 4 presents the model and explains our estimation approach.
Sections 57 contain the three steps of our analysis. Section 8 o¤ers concluding remarks.
3
2 Related Literature
The paper contributes to two literatures. The rst is the literature on experience rating
in insurance markets. For surveys, see, e.g., Pinquet (2000, 2013) and Antonio & Valdez
(2012).6 Most closely related are the handful of papers on multiline experience rating,
beginning with Jewell (1974). For example, Pinquet (1998) studies experience rating across
auto claims at fault and not at fault; Desjardins et al. (2001) and Angers et al. (2006) study
experience rating for eets of vehicles; Frees (2003) studies experience rating across multiple
lines within auto insurance; Englund et al. (2008) and Englund et al. (2009) study experience
rating across various types of commercial coverage; Frees et al. (2010) study experience rating
across multiple perils within home insurance; and Antonio et al. (2011) study experience
rating across multiple auto insurance policies. There are two main di¤erences between these
papers and ours. First, we study experience rating across home insurance (all perils) and
two lines of auto insurance (collision and comprehensive).7 Second, and more importantly,
we also study the e¤ects of multiline experience rating on the demand for coverage. This
underscores a key di¤erence in focus. Whereas these studies focus on the actuarial science
of experience rating, we focus on the economics of legal restrictions on experience rating.
The second related literature is the empirical literature on the regulation of insurance
markets, and in particular the strand that seeks to quantify the economic e¤ects of legal
restrictions on risk classication by insurers. For example, Buchmueller & DiNardo (2002),
Simon (2005), and Bundorf & Simon (2006) study the e¤ects of community rating in U.S.
health insurance markets; Finkelstein et al. (2009) study the e¤ects of a ban on gender-based
pricing in the U.K. annuity market; and Bundorf et al. (2012) and Geruso (2013) study the
e¤ects of uniform contribution requirements in the U.S. employer-provided health insurance
market.8 Again, there are the two main di¤erences between these papers and ours. First, we
6For textbook treatments, see Lemaire (1995), Bühlmann & Gisler (2005), and Denuit et al. (2007).
7Thuring (2011) and Thuring et al. (2012) study auto and home insurance but with a focus on cross-selling.
8Though it is not their focus, Einav et al. (2010) also consider the e¤ects of legal restrictions on risk
classication in the U.S. employer provided health insurance market. There also is a rich theoretical literature
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study the regulation of the U.S. auto and home insurance markets. Second, whereas these
papers study the e¤ects of restrictions on ex ante risk classication (i.e., classication rating),
we study the e¤ects of restrictions on ex post risk classication (i.e., experience rating).
3 Description of the Data
The source of the data is a large U.S. property and casualty insurance company. The company
o¤ers auto and home insurance. The full data set includes annual information on more than
400,000 households who purchased auto or home policies from the company between 1998
and 2006. All of the policies in the data are governed by New York law.9 The data contain
all the information in the companys records regarding the households and their policies. In
addition, the data record the number of claims that each household led with the company
under each of its policies during the period of observation.
We focus our attention on three lines of coverage: auto collision, auto comprehensive,
and home all perils. Auto collision coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle caused
by a collision with another vehicle or object, without regard to fault. Auto comprehensive
coverage pays for damage to the insured vehicle from all other causes (e.g., theft, re, ood,
windstorm, glass breakage, vandalism, hitting or being hit by an animal or by falling or ying
objects), without regard to fault. Home all perils coverage pays for damage to the insured
home from all causes (e.g., re, windstorm, hail, tornadoes, vandalism, or smoke damage),
except those that are specically excluded (e.g., ood, earthquake, or war). For simplicity,
we often refer to home all perils merely as home.
In most of the analysis, we consider an unbalanced panel of 62,425 households who
purchased all three coverages (auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home) in one or more
on insurance regulation and the social welfare implications of legal restrictions on risk classication (e.g.,
Hoy 1982; Crocker & Snow 1986; Hoy 2006; Thomas 2008; Crocker & Snow 2011; Rothschild 2011).
9As noted above, New York forbids experience rating of premiums for auto comprehensive or home
insurance coverage and also prohibits using auto comprehensive claims to experience rate premiums in any
other line of insurance coverage. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 2334 (2018); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regis. tit. 11,
§§ 161.8 & 169.1 (2018).
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years between 1998 and 2006. In all, this tricoverage sample comprises 294,917 household-
years. Table A1 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for the tricoverage sample.
Tables A2, A3, and A4 in the Appendix summarize the claims, premiums, and deductibles
in the tricoverage sample. The mean number of claims per household-year is 0:107 in auto
collision, 0:032 in auto comprehensive, and 0:079 in home.10 On average, households paid
annual premiums of $200 in auto collision, $127 in auto comprehensive, and $548 in home.
The mean deductibles per household-year are $396, $273, and $350 in auto collision, auto
comprehensive, and home, respectively. The modal deductibles are $500 in auto collision,
$200 in auto comprehensive, and $250 in home.
4 Model and Estimation Approach
A standard regression model for longitudinal univariate count data is the Poisson random
e¤ects model. We extend this model to multivariate count data here, claim counts under
three types of insurance coverage by allowing for correlated random e¤ects.11
Let yitk denote the number of claims for household i in year t under coverage k, where
i = 1; :::; N , t = 1; :::; Ti, and k 2 fc;m; hg. In the set of coverages, c denotes auto collision,
m denotes auto comprehensive, and h denotes home. Similarly, let xitk denote a vector of
observables (plus a constant) for household i in year t under coverage k.12 Let itk denote
10In the data, we observe the frequency of claims but not their severity. Hence, we focus on and dene
claim risk in terms of claim frequency. In our model of deductible choice, we assume that the loss associated
with every claim exceeds the maximum deductible option; see Section 7.
11By allowing for random e¤ects, our model accounts for overdispersion, including due to excess zeros, in
a similar way as the (pooled) negative binomial model (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2002, ch. 19). An alternative
approach would be a zero-inated model. However, Vuong (1989) and likelihood ratio tests select the negative
binomial model over the zero-inated model, suggesting that adjustment for excess zeros is not necessary
once we allow for random e¤ects.
12The variables that comprise xitk are listed in Tables A5 (auto) and A6 (home) in the Appendix. In
auto, they include the age, gender, and insurance score (which is based on information contained in credit
reports) of the primary driver, the age and gender of each additional driver, and the age, use, location, and
safety features of each vehicle. In home, they include the insurance score of the primary owner, the age,
value, use, location, type of construction, and safety features of the dwelling, whether the dwelling is owner
occupied, and the number of families that occupy the dwelling.
6
household is baseline claim rate in year t under coverage k, and let ik denote a time-constant
random e¤ect for household i under coverage k. Both itk and ik are unobserved.
We assume that claims for household i in year t under coverage k follow a Poisson arrival
process with rate itkik. Specically, we assume
yitkjxitk  Poisson (itkik) ;
where
itk = exp (x
0
itkk)
and i  [ic im ih]0 is iid with E(i) = [1 1 1]0 and V (i) = .
The parameters to be estimated are
 
266664
c
m
h
377775 and  
266664
2c mcmc hchc
cmcm 
2
m hmhm
chch mhmh 
2
h
377775 :
Of principal interest is the variance-covariance matrix, , which captures both the within-
coverage variance of unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk, 2  (2c ; 2m; 2h), and its
cross-coverage correlation structure,   (cm; ch; mh).
The likelihood function may be written as
Li =
Z
ih
Z
im
Z
ic
(Y
k
Y
t
exp ( itkik) (itkik)
yitk
yitk!
)
f(ic; im; ih)dicdimdih;
where f(ic; im; ih) is the trivariate density of i. A standard parametric approach is to
specify f and estimate the model by maximum likelihood. Typical specications of f include
the lognormal distribution and the gamma distribution (in which case Li reduces to the
product of negative binomial densities). In our case, however, the standard approach is
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computationally intractable. The likelihood function not only involves a multidimensional
integral, but, depending on f , it also may not have a closed-form expression.
We adopt a semiparametric, moments-based approach, which provides a computationally
tractable method for consistent estimation of  and  for all possible densities f . Under
this approach, estimation is via generalized estimating equations (GEE) based on marginal
moments.13 Given the assumptions of our model, we can derive the rst and second marginal
moments and use them to construct estimating equations for  and . More specically, we
use the rst marginal moment to dene a quasi-score equation, where the associated esti-
mating equation for  is based on a weighted least squares estimator with the weight matrix
dened by the covariance structure derived from the second marginal moment. The estimat-
ing equation for  is based on the relation between the empirical variance estimate and the
model dened covariance structure. The two estimating equations are solved iteratively to
obtain b and b. For further details about the estimation approach, see the Appendix.14
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Regression Estimates
Table 1 presents the estimates of the association parameters, 2 and , implied by b. The
estimates reveal that the variance of unobserved heterogeneity is lowest in auto collision (b2c =
0:11) and is roughly four times higher in auto comprehensive (b2m = 0:40) and home (b2h =
0:41). More importantly, the estimates also reveal that unobserved heterogeneity is correlated
across coverages each pairwise correlation is positive and statistically signicant. Perhaps
13GEE were introduced by Liang and Zeger and co-authors in the 1980s (see, e.g., Liang & Zeger 1986;
Zeger & Liang 1986; Zeger et al. 1988). For a textbook treatment of GEE, see, e.g., Ziegler (2011).
14See also Morris (2012) and Pinquet (2013). This approach is an extension of quasi-generalized pseudo
maximum likelihood (QGPML) estimators developed by Gouriéroux et al. (1984a,b) and the extended GEE
approach developed by Prentice (1988). The QGPML method can be characterized as rst order GEE with
a specic association structure. Prentice introduced an extension of rst order GEE that utilizes a second
set of estimating equations to jointly estimate the association parameters. QGPML can be embedded in the
GEE framework resulting in commonly studied consistency and asymptotic results for simultaneous inference
on both the regression parameters and the association parameters.
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not surprisingly, the strongest correlation is between auto collision and auto comprehensive
(bcm = 0:66). There is also a fairly strong correlation between auto comprehensive and home
(bmh = 0:56). The weakest correlation is between auto collision and home (bch = 0:29). Even
this correlation, however, is economically signicant, as we demonstrate in Sections 6 and 7.
Our primary interest in these correlations is their instrumental value in terms of predicting
claim risk and experience rating, which we explore in Sections 6 and 7. However, they are also
interesting in their own right, because they suggest that, even after controlling for observable
characteristics, there exists a latent, domain-general component to risk type. We elaborate
on this point in our concluding discussion in Section 8.
The estimates of the regression parameters, , are reported in Tables A5 (auto) and A6
(home) in the Appendix. Because  is not the object of primary interest, we relegate our
comments about the regression parameter estimates to the Appendix as well.
5.2 Robustness Checks
5.2.1 Alternative Samples
As a check of the sensitivity of the association parameter estimates to our sample restric-
tions, we re-estimate the model on two alternative samples of the data: (A) a balanced panel
of 8,731 households (78,579 household-years) who purchased all three coverages (auto colli-
sion, auto comprehensive, and home); and (B) an unbalanced panel of 203,731 households
(1,019,170 household-years) who purchased both auto coverages (collision and comprehen-
sive). The association parameter estimates for both alternative samples are reported in Table
A7 in the Appendix.15 They are largely consistent with the estimates for the tricoverage
sample. If anything, they suggest that our baseline estimates are conservative.
15To ease the computational burden of the re-estimations, we obtain estimates of the regression parameters
from a generalized linear model (GLM) assuming the random e¤ects follow a lognormal distribution. In the
tricoverage sample, the semiparametric and GLM estimates for  are nearly identical (R2 = 0:9998). Thus,
we are condent that using the GLM estimates for  does not corrupt the semiparametric estimates of the
association parameters in the re-estimations.
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5.2.2 Moral Hazard
Our approach implicitly assumes that a households claim risk is not a function of its choice
of deductible. That is, we assume households do not su¤er from moral hazard. In particular,
we assume there is neither ex ante moral hazard (deductible choice does not inuence the
frequency of claimable events) nor ex post moral hazard (deductible choice does not inu-
ence the decision to le a claim). The empirical evidence on moral hazard in auto insurance
markets is mixed (Cohen & Siegelman 2010), and we are not aware of any empirical evi-
dence on moral hazard in home insurance markets. Because deductibles are small relative
to the overall level of coverage, it seems reasonable to assume there is no ex ante moral
hazard. However, because the damage from a claimable event may occasionally be less than
the chosen deductible (at least for "high deductible" households), it may be less reasonable
to assume there is no ex post moral hazard. As a check of the sensitivity of the associ-
ation parameter estimates to our assumption on moral hazard, we re-estimate the model
separately for "low deductible" and "high deductible" households. We dene a household
as "low deductible" if none of its deductibles is greater than $250. Conversely, we dene a
household as "high deductible" if at least one of its deductibles is greater than $250. Table
A8 in the Appendix reports the association parameter estimates for low and high deductible
households.16 They are largely consistent with each other and with the estimates for the
tricoverage sample, suggesting that moral hazard is not an issue.17
6 Signaling Value of Claims Experience
In this section, we demonstrate the value of the information contained in the estimated
variance-covariance matrix b and, by implication, the signaling value of the households
16As before, the re-estimations use GLM estimates of the regression parameters assuming the random
e¤ects follow a lognormal distribution.
17Our test of moral hazard is also a test of adverse selection, as adverse selection also implies a correlation
between deductible choice and claim frequency (Chiappori & Salanié 2000). Accordingly, the results reported
in Table A8 in the Appendix also suggest that our estimates are robust to the possibility of adverse selection.
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claims histories by showing that conditioning on claims experience leads to material re-
nements of the predicted claim rates in the tricoverage sample. We also demonstrate the
incremental value of utilizing the information on the cross-coverage correlation structure of
unobserved heterogeneity (), as opposed to utilizing only the information on the within-
coverage variance of unobserved heterogeneity (2), by showing that conditioning across
lines of coverage (in addition to conditioning within lines of coverage) leads to material
incremental renements of the predicted claim rates.
Throughout this section and beyond, we distinguish among three types of predicted claim
rates. The rst are prior claim rates, bitk  exp(x0itkbk). These are a priori predicted claim
rates based on ex ante observables. The second are uniline posterior claim rates, b#itk bitkEUL(ikjyik) for each coverage k = c;m; h, where yik  (yi1k; :::; yiTik) and EUL(ikjyik) is
calculated assuming ik
iid lognormal with E(ik) = 1 and V (ik) = b2k. These are a posteriori
predicted claim rates conditional on within-coverage ex post claims experience. The third
are multiline posterior claim rates, bitk  bitkEML(ikjyi), where yi  (yic;yim;yih) and
EML(ikjyi) is calculated assuming i  [ic im ih]0 iid lognormal with E(i) = [1 1 1]0
and V (i) = b. These are a posteriori predicted claim rates conditional on ex post claims
experience both within and across lines of coverages. The derivations of EUL(ikjyik) and
EML(ikjyi) are set forth in the Appendix.
Our approach to updating the prior claim rates accords with standard Bayesian credibility
theory. In actuarial parlance, credibility refers to statistical methods that combine individual
and class estimates of the risk premium (i.e., the expected number of claims). Bayesian cred-
ibility refers to credibility approaches that utilize Bayestheorem. The Bayesian credibility
premium is the a priori predicted claim rate (the class estimate) multiplied by an a posteriori
correction also known as a bonus-malus coe¢ cient that reects idiosyncratic claim risk
(the individual estimate). In particular, b#itk  bitkEUL(ikjyik) corresponds to the textbook
Bayesian credibility premium where EUL(ikjyik) is the bonus-malus coe¢ cient for the
single-line Poisson-lognormal credibility model, and bitk  bitkEML(ikjyi) is the extension to
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the multiple-line case. A noteworthy property of the Bayesian credibility approach is that it
is balanced: E
 
EUL(ikjyik)

= 1 and E
 
EML(ikjyi))

= 1 for each coverage k 2 fc;m; hg,
so the bonus-malus corrections average to unity. For more on Bayesian credibility theory,
see generally, e.g., Denuit et al. (2007, ch. 3).
To demonstrate that conditioning on claims experience leads to material renements of
the predicted claim rates, we compare the empirical distribution of the prior claim rates,bitk, with that of the multiline posterior claim rates, bitk. Figure 1 plots, for each coverage
k, the kernel density of itk  (bitk   bitk)=bitk. Further details are set forth in Table 2. For
households with negative values of itk, the mean value of itk is  7 percent in auto collision,
 13 percent in auto comprehensive, and  14 percent in home. For a quarter of these
households, itk is less than 9 percent in auto collision,  19 percent in auto comprehensive,
and  20 percent in home. For a tenth, itk is less than  12 percent in auto collision and
 24 percent in both auto comprehensive and home. The numbers are even more striking
for households with positive values of itk. For these households, the mean value of itk is
+10 percent in auto collision, +23 percent in auto comprehensive, and +28 percent in home.
For a quarter of these households, itk exceeds +14 percent in auto collision, +31 percent
in auto comprehensive, and +37 percent in home. For a tenth, itk exceeds +23 percent in
auto collision, +53 percent in auto comprehensive, and +65 percent in home. The numbers
are similar for households with low, medium, and high prior claim rates,18 suggesting that
the value of the information in b is robust to di¤erences in baseline claim risk.
To show the incremental value of conditioning across lines of coverage, we compare the
empirical distribution of the multiline posterior claim rates, bitk, with that of the uniline
posterior claim rates, b#itk. Figure 2 plots, for each coverage k, the kernel density of  itk 
(bitk   b#itk)=b#itk. Further details are set forth in Table 3. For households with negative
values of  itk, the mean value of  itk is  3 percent in auto collision,  10 percent in auto
18A prior claim rate is "low" if it is in the bottom quartile and "high" if it is in the top quartile. It is
"medium" otherwise. In the tricoverage sample, the respective low and high cuto¤s are 0.078 and 0.127 in
auto collision, 0.016 and 0.044 in auto comprehensive, and 0.054 and 0.096 in home.
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comprehensive, and  4 percent in home, and for a tenth  itk is less than  6 percent in auto
collision,  17 percent in auto comprehensive, and  8 percent in home. Again, the numbers
are more striking for households with positive values of itk. For these households, the mean
value of  itk is +7 percent in auto collision, +16 percent in auto comprehensive, and +9
percent in home, and for a tenth  itk exceeds +15 percent in auto collision, +36 percent
in auto comprehensive, and +21 percent in home. As before, the numbers are similar for
households with low, medium, and high prior claim rates, suggesting that the incremental
value of the information in b is robust to di¤erences in baseline claim risk.
7 Experience Rating and Deductible Choices
The previous section demonstrates the signaling value of the householdsclaims experience.
In this section, we investigate the extent to which the householdsdemand for insurance
coverage, as captured by their deductible choices, would respond to experience rating. As
noted above, this yields a lower bound on the potential for unpriced heterogeneity to distort
their demand for insurance coverage, which in turn sheds light on the potential for experience
rating to reduce market ine¢ ciency due to unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk.
7.1 Experience Rating
In each coverage, the company uses the same basic procedure to generate a households pric-
ing menu of premium-deductible combinations. The company rst determines a households
base price p according to a coverage-specic rating function, which takes into account the
households coverage-relevant characteristics and any applicable discounts. Using the base
price, the company then generates the households pricing menuM = f(p(d); d) : d 2 Dg,
which associates a premium p(d) with each deductible d in the coverage-specic set of de-
ductible options D, according to a coverage-specic multiplication rule, p(d) = (g(d)  p) + ,
where g () is a decreasing positive function and  > 0. The multiplicative factors fg(d) : d 2
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Dg are known as the deductible factors and  is a small markup known as the expense fee.
The deductible factors and the expense fee are coverage specic but household invariant.
We assume that the companys experience rating scheme is a simple bonus-malus system
under which base prices are adjusted in proportion to changes in predicted claim risk. Let pULik
denote household is experience rated base price in coverage k in the case of uniline experience
rating (i.e., when premiums are experience rated only within coverages), and let pMLik denote
household is experience rated base price in coverage k in the case of multiline experience
rating (i.e., when premiums are experience rated both within and across coverages). We
assume that
pULik =
b#ikbik  pik and pMLik =
bikbik  pik;
where bik, b#ik, and bik denote household is prior claim rate, uniline posterior claim rate, and
multiline posterior claim rate, respectively, in coverage k. Recall that b#ik = bikEUL(ikjyik)
and bik = bikEML(ikjyi). Hence,
pULik = E
UL(ikjyik) pik and pMLik = EML(ikjyi) pik;
where EUL(ikjyik) and EML(ikjyi) are the bonus-malus coe¢ cients in the single-line and
multiple-line Poisson-lognormal credibility models, respectively (see, e.g., Denuit et al. 2007,
ch. 3; Pinquet 2013). Table 4 summarizes the uniline and multiline bonus-malus coe¢ cients.
Note that the uniline and multiline experience rating schemes are balanced in that the bonus-
malus coe¢ cients average to unity in each coverage.
7.2 Deductible Choices
We proceed in two steps to investigate how householdsdeductible choices would respond
to experience rating. First, we assume that households make deductible choices according
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to standard expected utility theory. Second, we investigate how deductible choices would
change when we move from prior premiums to uniline premiums and multiline premiums.19
7.2.1 A Model of Deductible Choice
A household i faces a menu of premium-deductible pairs f(pi(d); d) : d 2 Dg. The household
experiences at most one claim during the policy period, and it believes the probability of
experiencing a claim is i. In the event of a claim, the loss exceeds the maximum deductible
option and payment of the deductible is the only cost associated with the claim. Under these
assumptions, the households choice of deductible involves a choice among lotteries of the
form Li(d)  ( pi(d); 1  i; pi(d)  d; i) :
Under the standard expected utility model, the utility of lottery Li(d) is given by
Ui(Li(d)) = (1  i)ui (wi   pi(d)) + iui (wi   pi(d)  d) ; (1)
where ui () is the households Bernoulli utility function and wi is its wealth. We assume
that household i chooses a deductible d 2 D to maximize Ui(Li(d)).
We assume that every household has the same utility function: ui () = u() for all i.20
For u(), we consider a second-order Taylor expansion. Also, because u() is unique only up
to an a¢ ne transformation, we normalize the scale of utility by dividing by u0(). With this
specication, equation (1) becomes
Ui(Li(d)) =   [pi(d) + id] 
r
2

(1  i) (pi(d))2 + i (pi(d) + d)2

; (2)
where r =  u00()=u0() is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion.
19In the Appendix, we also consider a generalization of the expected utility model that allows for probability
distortions.
20Despite the simplistic assumption of homogeneous preferences, the model ts the data reasonably well.
It correctly predicts 53 percent of the deductible choices in home, 37 percent in auto collision, and 27 percent
in auto comprehensive.
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We calibrate the model with the estimate for r reported by Barseghyan et al. (2013)
[hereafter, BMOT]. BMOT estimate equation (2) using a cross section of 4,170 households in
the tricoverage sample. They arrive at their estimation sample by imposing two restrictions.
First, they restrict attention to households who rst purchased their auto and home policies
in the same year, in either 2005 or 2006. This is meant to avoid temporal issues, such as
changes in household characteristics and in the economic environment. Second, they consider
only the initial deductible choices of each household. This is meant to increase condence
that they are working with active choices; one might be concerned that some households
renew their policies without actively reassessing their deductible choices. To account for
observationally equivalent households choosing di¤erent deductibles, BMOT assume random
utility with additively separable choice noise. Specically, they assume that the utility from
deductible d 2 D is U(d)  U(Li(d)) + "i;d, where "i;d follows a type 1 extreme value
distribution with scale parameter . In addition, they assume that i = 1   exp( b#i).
Estimating the model by maximum likelihood, they report br = 0:0129.
7.3 Results
We use the calibrated model to investigate the extent to which the householdsdeductible
choices would change if premiums were experience rated. In particular, we examine how
the distribution of model-predicted deductible choices changes when we counterfactually
move from prior premiums (i.e., premiums generated using non-experience rated base prices,
pik) to uniline premiums and multiline premiums (i.e., premiums generated using uniline
experienced rated base prices, pULik , and multiline experienced rated base prices, p
ML
ik ). In
each case, we assume that households believe their claim probability is i = 1  exp( bi).
Table 5 presents the results. In addition to displaying the distributions, the table reports
the percentage of policies in which the deductible choice changes when we move from prior
premiums to uniline and multiline premiums, as well as the resulting (absolute) changes
in coverage. The main takeaway is that the response of deductible choices to experience
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rating would be substantial. When we move from prior premiums to uniline premiums,
the deductible choice changes in 5 percent of auto collision policies, 12 percent of auto
comprehensive policies, and 14 percent of home policies, resulting in average changes in
coverage of $247, $164, and $343, respectively, among policies with a change, and of $13,
$20, and $47, respectively, among all policies. When we move from prior premiums to
multiline premiums, the deductible choice changes in 7 percent of auto collision policies, 21
percent of auto comprehensive policies, and 15 percent of home policies, resulting in average
changes in coverage of $247, $178, and $347, respectively, among policies with a change and
of $17, $38, and $51, respectively, among all policies.21
8 Conclusion
We examine the cost of legal restrictions on experience rating in auto and home insurance.
Using data on claims histories, we rst estimate the variance-covariance matrix of unobserved
heterogeneity in claim risk. We nd, inter alia, that unobserved heterogeneity in claim risk
is positively correlated across coverages. As noted above, this suggests that there is a latent,
domain-general component to risk type. This nding adds to a growing body of evidence
that riskiness is a trans-substantive characteristic of individuals (e.g., Barksy et al. 1997;
Dohmen et al. 2011; Golden et al. 2016). It also complements existing research suggesting
that risk aversion, though not completely stable across contexts (Barseghyan et al. 2011),
also has latent, domain-general component (e.g., Einav et al. 2012; Barseghyan et al. 2016).22
Next, we show that conditioning on claims experience leads to material renements of
predicted claim rates, with the average downward revisions ranging from 7 percent to 14
percent and the average upward revisions ranging from 10 percent to 28 percent. Accord-
ingly, for the average household who has prior predicted claim rates of 10:7 percent in auto
collision, 3:2 percent in auto comprehensive, and 7:9 percent in home such conditioning
21The results for the model with probability distortions are reported in the Appendix. The main takeaway
is the same.
22But see Barseghyan et al. (2018).
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implies posterior predicted claim rates of 10:0 percent, 2:8 percent, and 6:8 percent, respec-
tively, in the case of downward revisions and of 11:8 percent, 3:9 percent, and 10:1 percent,
respectively, in the case of upward revisions.
Lastly, we assess how insuredsdemand for coverage would respond to experience rating
assuming that households make deductible choices according to standard expected utility
theory. We nd that the demand response to experience rating would be large. Across
the three coverages, we nd that anywhere from 7 percent to 21 percent of households
would change their deductible in response to multiline experience rating, resulting in average
changes in coverage ranging from $178 to $347 among policies with a change.
The main takeaway from our analysis is that in the absence of experience rating there
would be considerable unpriced heterogeneity in claim risk that in turn would lead to sizable
distortions in households demand for insurance coverage. In other words, our analysis
suggests that the cost of legal restrictions on experience rating can be substantial. We
believe this is important for policymakers to keep in mind. As noted above, regulation of
experience rating is widespread in the United States. In auto and home insurance, New
York is just one of many states that limit insurersability to engage in experience rating.23
For instance, California and Oklahoma prohibit increasing an insureds premium for auto
collision insurance on the basis of an accident for which the insured was not at fault;24 Florida
and Pennsylvania prohibit increasing an insureds premium for auto comprehensive insurance
on the basis of an accident whether or not the insured was at fault;25 and Oklahoma and
Texas prohibit increasing an insureds premium for home insurance on the basis of a weather
related claim or the rst non-weather related claim.26
23As noted above, New York forbids experience rating of premiums for auto comprehensive or home
insurance coverage and also prohibits using auto comprehensive claims to experience rate premiums in any
other line of insurance coverage. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 2334 (2018); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regis. tit. 11,
§§ 161.8 & 169.1 (2018).
24See Cal. Ins. Code §§ 1861.02.025 (2018); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 10, §§ 2632.1213.1 (2018); Okla. Stat.
tit. 36, § 941 (2018).
25See Fla. Stat. ch. 626.9541(o)(10) (2018); 31 Pa. Code § 67.33(b)(3) (2018).
26See Okla. Stat. tit. 36, § 3691.1 (2018); Okla. Admin. Code § 365:15-7-26 (2018); 28 Tex. Admin.
Code § 21.1004 (2018).
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Of course, in order to determine whether any particular legal restriction on experience
rating is worth the cost, a policymaker would need to conduct a full-edged welfare analysis
(assuming she takes a welfarist approach to policymaking). Although such an analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper, we can sketch out what it would entail. First and foremost,
one would have to specify a social welfare function, which presumably would take into ac-
count the utility of both insureds and insurers. In addition, one would have to model and
predict not only the behavior of insureds on the intensive margin (as we do), but also the
behavior of insureds on the extensive margin and the behavior of insurers. This is because
legal restrictions on experience rating can have long-term market e¤ects beyond the short-
term demand e¤ects that we consider. For instance, they can lead to risk-based adverse
selection and higher insurance costs. Indeed, several studies of the auto insurance market
nd that insurance costs are higher when rate regulation generates cross-subsidies from low-
to high-risk insureds (e.g., Weiss et al. 2010; Derrig & Tennyson 2011). Needless to say, one
would have to make di¢ cult normative judgments in specifying the social welfare function.
Moreover, the positive analysis would be sensitive to the assumptions that one makes about
behavior. This is a topic that we hope to explore in future research.
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Estimate
Variances:
Auto collision 0.107 0.065 0.149
Auto comprehensive 0.399 0.221 0.577
Home 0.405 0.383 0.428
Covariances:
Auto collision and auto comprehensive 0.137 0.101 0.173
Auto collision and home 0.061 0.022 0.099
Auto comprehensive and home 0.225 0.179 0.271
Correlations:
Auto collision and auto comprehensive 0.663 0.399 0.926
Auto collision and home 0.293 0.099 0.486
Auto comprehensive and home 0.559 0.389 0.729
95 percent 
confidence interval
Table 1: Association Parameter Estimates
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
Coverage
Prior 
claim 
rates Observations Mean
10th 
percentile
25th 
percentile Observations Mean
75th 
percentile
90th 
percentile
All 180,909 -0.066 -0.121 -0.093 114,008 0.101 0.140 0.227
Low 46,914 -0.055 -0.100 -0.080 26,815 0.094 0.129 0.213
Medium 89,988 -0.066 -0.120 -0.094 57,471 0.100 0.139 0.223
High 44,007 -0.078 -0.143 -0.110 29,722 0.110 0.152 0.249
All 188,792 -0.132 -0.236 -0.186 106,125 0.231 0.310 0.531
Low 47,384 -0.111 -0.198 -0.157 26,345 0.198 0.270 0.455
Medium 94,742 -0.131 -0.233 -0.186 52,717 0.231 0.307 0.533
High 46,666 -0.155 -0.273 -0.220 27,063 0.264 0.353 0.593
All 196,205 -0.142 -0.241 -0.198 98,712 0.280 0.367 0.646
Low 51,136 -0.120 -0.207 -0.166 22,593 0.273 0.350 0.630
Medium 97,208 -0.146 -0.238 -0.200 50,251 0.277 0.365 0.642
High 47,861 -0.159 -0.271 -0.227 25,868 0.292 0.390 0.663
Notes: A prior claim rate is "low" if it is in the bottom quartile and "high" if it is in the top quartile. It is "medium" otherwise. In the 
tricoverage sample, the respective low and high cutoffs are 0.078 and 0.127 in auto collision, 0.016 and 0.044 in auto comprehensive, 
and 0.054 and 0.096 in home.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for η=(θ-λ)/λ
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
Auto collision
Auto 
Comprehensive
Home
η<0 η>0
Coverage
Prior 
claim 
rates Observations Mean
10th 
percentile
25th 
percentile Observations Mean
75th 
percentile
90th 
percentile
All 198,557 -0.034 -0.059 -0.046 96,360 0.069 0.093 0.153
Low 51,883 -0.030 -0.052 -0.041 21,846 0.067 0.092 0.148
Medium 99,078 -0.034 -0.059 -0.047 48,381 0.069 0.093 0.153
High 47,596 -0.038 -0.065 -0.052 26,133 0.070 0.095 0.157
All 183,662 -0.098 -0.173 -0.139 111,255 0.157 0.217 0.357
Low 46,521 -0.095 -0.171 -0.135 27,208 0.163 0.224 0.370
Medium 91,981 -0.099 -0.175 -0.140 55,478 0.159 0.220 0.359
High 45,160 -0.098 -0.173 -0.139 28,569 0.149 0.207 0.334
All 202,137 -0.044 -0.079 -0.059 92,780 0.093 0.132 0.211
Low 51,610 -0.040 -0.074 -0.055 22,119 0.093 0.135 0.213
Medium 101,001 -0.046 -0.082 -0.062 46,458 0.095 0.134 0.214
High 49,526 -0.044 -0.080 -0.059 24,203 0.090 0.126 0.203
Notes: A prior claim rate is "low" if it is in the bottom quartile and "high" if it is in the top quartile. It is "medium" otherwise. In the 
tricoverage sample, the respective low and high cutoffs are 0.078 and 0.127 in auto collision, 0.016 and 0.044 in auto comprehensive, 
and 0.054 and 0.096 in home.
Home
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for ζ=(θ-ϑ)/ϑ
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
ζ<0 ζ>0
Auto collision
Auto 
Comprehensive
Coll Comp Home Coll Comp Home
Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Standard deviation 0.08 0.17 0.26 0.11 0.24 0.27
5th percentile 0.91 0.86 0.79 0.87 0.75 0.75
10th percentile 0.92 0.89 0.81 0.89 0.78 0.78
25th percentile 0.94 0.92 0.85 0.93 0.85 0.83
Median 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.97 0.93 0.91
75th percentile 1.04 0.98 1.08 1.05 1.08 1.08
90th percentile 1.11 1.23 1.29 1.14 1.28 1.32
95th percentile 1.16 1.32 1.50 1.20 1.45 1.53
Table 4: Summary of Bonus-Malus Coefficients
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
Univariate Multivariate
Prior Uniline Multiline
Deductible choice premiums premiums premiums
$100 2,374 2,389 2,409
$200 0 0 0
$250 34,564 34,723 34,751
$500 24,004 23,872 23,808
$1,000 1,483 1,441 1,457
Policies with change in deductible (percent) - 5.3 6.8
Aggregate changes in coverage (dollars), gross (absolute value) - 820,750 1,046,450
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), policies with change - 246.99 246.86
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), all policies - 13.15 16.76
Prior Uniline Multiline
Deductible choice premiums premiums premiums
$50 7 4 4
$100 3,633 3,723 3,633
$200 10,444 10,643 10,822
$250 15,144 15,359 15,636
$500 27,979 27,530 27,276
$1,000 5,218 5,166 5,054
Policies with change in deductible (percent) - 12.4 20.9
Aggregate changes in coverage (dollars), gross - 1,276,800 2,348,350
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), policies with change - 164.47 179.91
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), all policies - 20.45 37.62
Prior Uniline Multiline
Deductible choice premiums premiums premiums
$100 85 69 70
$250 31,871 32,851 32,993
$500 18,440 17,972 17,847
$1,000 11,632 11,160 11,139
$2,500 318 304 303
$5,000 79 69 73
Policies with change in deductible (percent) - 13.5 14.7
Aggregate changes in coverage (dollars), gross - 2,902,500 3,187,200
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), policies with change - 343.45 347.45
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), all policies - 46.50 51.06
Panel C: Home
Table 5: Response of Deductible Choices to Experience Rating
Panel A: Auto collision
Panel B: Auto comprehensive
Tricoverage Sample (62,425 policies)
Figure 1: Kernel density of 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
 
  
Figure 2: Kernel density of 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
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A Descriptive Statistics
Table A1 provides descriptive statistics for the tricoverage sample. Tables A2, A3, and A4
summarize the claims, premiums, and deductibles in the tricoverage sample.
B Estimation Approach
Let yitk denote the number of claims for household i in year t under coverage k, where
i = 1; : : : ; N , t = 1; : : : ; Ti, and k 2 fc;m; hg. Similarly, let xitk denote a vector of observables
(plus a constant) for household i in year t under coverage k. Let itk denote household is
baseline claim rate in year t under coverage k, and let ik denote a time-constant random
e¤ect for household i under coverage k. Also, let yik  (yi1k; :::; yiTik) and yi  (yic;yim;yih),
and let ik  (i1k; :::; iTik) and i  (ic;im;ih).
The rst two marginal moments for the class of models used in this research longitudinal
multivariate count models with multiplicative correlated random e¤ects are
E(yitkjxitk) = exp (x0itkk) = itk
and
Vi  V ar(yijxi) = diag(0i) + 
 1Ti10Ti  i0i;
where  is element-wise multiplication, 
 is the Kronecker product, and 1Ti is a Ti-dimensional
vector of ones.
The moment-based approach for tting this model relies on the moment conditions im-
plied by the marginal mean and variance along with the basic assumptions for multiplicative
correlated random e¤ects models. The estimator (b; b) for   [c m h]0 and is dened
as the solution to
X
i
 
D0i 0
0 E0i
! 
Vi 0
0 I
! 1 
yi   i
Ri  Vi
!
= 0;
where
Di  @i
@
= diag [x0icic x
0
imim x
0
ihih]
0
;
Vi is the model based variance-covariance matrix as dened above,
Ei  @V

i
@
= diag

(ic
0
ic)

(im
0
im)

(ih
0
ih)

(ic
0
im)

(ic
0
ih)

(im
0
ih)

;
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I is the identity matrix, and Ri is the cross product of residuals ritk  yitk   itk. Also,
let  indicate a half-vectorization operator, such that Ri , V

i , and 
 are the vectors of the
upper triangular elements of the matrices Ri, Vi, and , respectively. The roots of the set
of estimating equations are obtained via an iterative procedure, updated at each iteration
with the consistent estimator of  given b and the consistent estimator of  given b, until
convergence. See Morris (2012) for more details on the estimation algorithm and asymptotic
results for joint inference.
C Regression Estimates
Tables A5 (auto) and A6 (home) report the estimates of the regression parameters, .
Although  is not the object of principal interest, the estimates reveal several noteworthy
facts. First, auto claim rates (collision and comprehensive) are negatively related to insurance
score (which is based on information contained in credit reports) but positively related
to the age and number of vehicles. However, they are not correlated with vehicle safety
features (passive restraint, anti-theft, and anti-lock brakes). Second, collision claim rates are
negatively related to the age of the primary driver and are higher for households in which
the primary driver is female. Conversely, comprehensive claim rates are positively related
to the age of the primary driver and are lower for households in which the primary driver
is female. Third, collision claim rates are higher for households with three or more drivers.
Finally, home claim rates are negatively related to insurance score but positively related to
the age and insured value of the home. In addition, they are higher for homes that are used
for farming or business and for homes that are not the owners primary residence. Home
claim rates, however, are not correlated with home safety features (masonry construction,
distance to re hydrant, and alarm or other protection).
D Derivations of EUL(ikjyik) and EML(ikjyi)
Let yitk denote the number of claims for household i in year t under coverage k, where
i = 1; : : : ; N , t = 1; : : : ; Ti, and k 2 fc;m; hg. Similarly, let xitk denote a vector of observables
(plus a constant) for household i in year t under coverage k. Let itk denote household is
baseline claim rate in year t under coverage k, and let ik denote a time-constant random
e¤ect for household i under coverage k. Also, let yik  (yi1k; :::; yiTik) and yi  (yic;yim;yih).
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D.1 Derivation of EML(ikjyi)
We assume
yitkjxitk  Poisson (itkik) ;
where
itk = exp (x
0
itkk)
and i  [ic im ih]0 iid lognormal with E(i) = [1 1 1]0 and V (i) = . This leads to the
following probability distribution functions:
f(yiji) =
Y
k
Y
t
Poisson(itkik)
=
Y
k
Y
t
(ikitk)
yitk
yitk!
e ikitk
=
 Y
k

P
t
yitk
ik e
 ik
P
t
itk
! Y
k
Y
t
yitkitk
yitk!
!
;
f(~i) = Normal(~; ~)
=
1
(2)3=2
j ~j 1=2e  12 (~i ~)0 ~ 1(~i ~);
where ~i  ln(i), ~   diag( ~)2 , and ~  ln ( + 1), and
f(yi) =
Z
~ic
Z
~im
Z
~ih
f(yij~i)f(~i) d~ihd~imd~ic
=
Z
~ic
Z
~im
Z
~ih
Y
k
Y
t
Poisson(itke
~ik) MVN(~; ~) d~ihd~imd~ic
=
1
(2)3=2
j~j 1=2
 Y
k
Y
t
yitkitk
yitk!
!Z
~ic
Z
~im
Z
~ih
gML(~i) d~ihd~imd~ic;
where gML(~i) 
Q
k
e
~ik
P
t
yitk
e
 e~ikP
t
itk

e 
1
2
(~i ~)0 ~ 1(~i ~). Taken together, the posterior
distribution is dened as
f(~ijyi) = f(yij~i)f(~i)
f(yi)
=
gML(~i)R
~ic
R
~im
R
~ih
gML(~i) d~ihd~imd~ic
;
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and the expectation is
EML(ijyi) =
Z
~ic
Z
~im
Z
~ih
264 e
~ic
e~im
e~ih
375 f(~ijyi) d~ihd~imd~ic:
D.2 Derivation of EUL(ikjyik)
The univariate expectation, EUL(ikjyik), is a special case of the multivariate expectation,
EML(ijyi). Replacing the conditional and marginal distribution functions with their uni-
variate counterparts, the univariate posterior distribution is
f(~ikjyik) = f(yikj~ik)f(~ik)
f(yik)
=
gUL(~ik)R
~ik
gUL(~i) d~ik
;
where gUL(~ik) 

e
~ik
P
t
yitk
e
 e~ikP
t
itk

e
  1
2~2
k
(~ik ~k)0(~ik ~k)
and k 2 fc;m; hg, and the uni-
variate expectation is
EUL(ikjyik) =
Z
~ik
e~ikf(~ikjyik) d~ik
for k 2 fc;m; hg.
E Robutness Checks
Table A7 reports the association parameter estimates for alternative samples A and B. Alter-
native sample A comprises a balanced panel of households who purchased all three coverages
(auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home). Alternative sample B comprises an unbal-
anced panel of households who purchased both auto coverages (collision and comprehensive).
Table A8 reports the association parameter estimates for low and high deductible house-
holds. A low deductible household is a household with no deductible greater than $250. A
high deductible household is a household with at least one deductible greater than $250.
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F Deductible Choices: Probability Distortion Model
In the main text, we investigate how householdsdeductible choices would respond to ex-
perience rating under the assumption that households make deductible choice according to
standard expected utility theory. Here, we investigate how householdsdeductible choices
would respond to experience rating under the assumption that households make deductible
choice according to a generalization of the expected utility model that allows for probability
distortions. We refer to this model as the probability distortion model.
As before, a household i faces a menu of premium-deductible pairs f(pi(d); d) : d 2 Dg.
The household experiences at most one claim during the policy period, and it believes the
probability of experiencing a claim is i. In the event of a claim, the loss exceeds the
maximum deductible option and payment of the deductible is the only cost associated with
the claim. Under these assumptions, the households choice of deductible involves a choice
among lotteries of the form Li(d)  ( pi(d); 1  i; pi(d)  d; i) :
Under the probability distortion model, the utility of lottery Li(d) is given by
Ui(Li(d)) = (1  
i(i))ui (wi   pi(d)) + 
i(i)ui (wi   pi(d)  d) ; (A1)
where ui () is the households Bernoulli utility function, wi is its wealth, and 
i () is its
probability distortion function. Given our setting, this model is quite general in that it
includes several others as special cases, including models of subjective beliefs, rank-dependent
probability weighting (Quiggin 1982; Tversky & Kahneman 1992), loss aversion (K½oszegi &
Rabin 2006, 2007), and disappointment aversion (Gul 1991). For further details about the
probability distortion model, see Barseghyan et al. (2013) [hereafter, BMOT].
We assume that every household has the same utility function and probability distortion
function: ui () = u() and 
i () = 
 () for all i.1 For u(), we consider a second-order Taylor
expansion. Also, because u() is unique only up to an a¢ ne transformation, we normalize
the scale of utility by dividing by u0(). With this specication, equation (A1) becomes
Ui(Li(d)) =   [pi(d) + 
(i)d] 
r
2

(1  
(i)) (pi(d))2 + 
(i) (pi(d) + d)2

; (A2)
where r =  u00()=u0() is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion.
We calibrate the model with the estimates for r and 
 () reported by BMOT. They
estimate equation (A2) using a cross section of 4,170 households in the tricoverage sample.
They arrive at their estimation sample by imposing two restrictions. First, they restrict
1Despite the simplistic assumption of homogeneous preferences, the model ts the data reasonably well.
It correctly predicts 62 percent of deductible choices in home, 42 percent in auto collision, and 34 percent
in auto comprehensive.
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attention to households who rst purchased their auto and home policies in the same year,
in either 2005 or 2006. This is meant to avoid temporal issues, such as changes in household
characteristics and in the economic environment. Second, they consider only the initial
deductible choices of each household. This is meant to increase condence that they are
working with active choices; one might be concerned that some households renew their
policies without actively reassessing their deductible choices. To account for observationally
equivalent households choosing di¤erent deductibles, BMOT assume random utility with
additively separable choice noise. Specically, they assume that the utility from deductible
d 2 D is U(d)  U(Li(d)) + "i;d, where "i;d follows a type 1 extreme value distribution
with scale parameter . In addition, they assume that 
(i) = exp(0 + 1i + 2
2
i ) and
i = 1  exp( b#i). Estimating the model by maximum likelihood, they report br = 0:00064
and b
(i) = exp( 2:71 + 12:03i   35:152i ).
We use the calibrated model to investigate the extent to which the householdsdeductible
choices would change if premiums were experience rated. In particular, we examine how
the distribution of model-predicted deductible choices changes when we counterfactually
move from prior premiums (i.e., premiums generated using non-experience rated base prices,
pik) to uniline premiums and multiline premiums (i.e., premiums generated using uniline
experienced rated base prices, pULik , and multiline experienced rated base prices, p
ML
ik ). In
each case, we assume that households believe their claim probability is i = 1  exp( bi).
Table A9 presents the results. In addition to displaying the distributions, the table reports
the percentage of policies in which the deductible choice changes when we move from prior
premiums to uniline and multiline premiums, as well as the resulting (absolute) changes in
coverage. The main takeaway here is the same as it is under the expected utility model the
response of deductible choices to experience rating would be substantial. When we move
from prior premiums to uniline premiums, the deductible choice changes in 5 percent of auto
collision policies, 14 percent of auto comprehensive policies, and 12 percent of home policies,
resulting in average changes in coverage of $262, $144, and $336, respectively, among policies
with a change, and of $14, $21, and $39, respectively, among all policies. When we move
from prior premiums to multiline premiums, the deductible choice changes in 7 percent of
auto collision policies, 25 percent of auto comprehensive policies, and 13 percent of home
policies, resulting in average changes in coverage of $262, $149, and $337, respectively, among
policies with a change and of $18, $38, and $43, respectively, among all policies.
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Mean
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
Auto:
Driver 1 age (years) 56.10 14.70 19 99
Driver 1 female 0.33 0.47 0 1
Driver 1 single 0.22 0.41 0 1
Driver 1 married 0.63 0.48 0 1
Driver 1 insurance score 789.51 106.50 297 996
Driver 2 0.48 0.50 0 1
Driver 2 age (years) 50.28 12.93 16 94
Driver 2 female 0.91 0.28 0 1
Driver 3+ 0.04 0.21 0 1
Young driver 0.01 0.10 0 1
Vehicle 1 age (years) 4.43 3.59 -1 46
Vehicle 1 personal use 0.47 0.50 0 1
Vehicle 1 passive restraint 0.99 0.10 0 1
Vehicle 1 anti-theft 0.57 0.49 0 1
Vehicle 1 anti-lock brakes 0.79 0.41 0 1
Vehicle 2 0.53 0.50 0 1
Vehicle 2 age (years) 5.94 5.53 -1 83
Vehicle 2 personal use 0.55 0.50 0 1
Vehicle 2 passive restraint 0.94 0.24 0 1
Vehicle 2 anti-theft 0.46 0.50 0 1
Vehicle 2 anti-lock brakes 0.70 0.46 0 1
Vehicle 3+ 0.05 0.22 0 1
Home:
Home age (years) 45.05 27.20 0 206
Insured value (thousands of dollars) 153.31 75.63 1 3,250
Farm or business 0.02 0.15 0 1
Primary residence 1.00 0.04 0 1
Owner occupied 0.98 0.14 0 1
Number of families 1.16 1.89 1 99
Masonry construction 0.07 0.25 0 1
Distance to fire hydrant (feet) 401.83 514.82 0 30,000
Alarm or other protection 0.95 0.22 0 1
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Note: Insurance score is based on information contained in credit reports.
Count Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
0 265,692  90.09      285,923  96.95      273,984  92.90      
1 27,186    9.22        8,495      2.88        18,886    6.40        
2 1,890      0.64        467         0.16        1,872      0.63        
3 140         0.05        30           0.01        159         0.05        
4 6             - -              - 12           -
5 3             - 2             - 2             -
6 2             -
Note: Dash indicates less than 0.01 percent.
Table A2: Claims
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
Auto collision Auto comprehensive Home
Auto collision
Auto 
comprehensive Home
Mean 200 127 548
Standard deviation 104 70 309
Minimum 20 6 50
1st percentile 60 34 204
5th percentile 82 48 265
10th percentile 97 58 296
25th percentile 129 81 359
Median 178 113 466
75th percentile 243 157 638
90th percentile 327 210 891
95th percentile 393 250 1,110
99th percentile 560 358 1,683
Maximum 2,520 2,524 10,224
Note: Amounts in dollars.
Table A3: Premiums
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
Deductible Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
$50 - - 34,007    11.53      - -
$100 7,846      2.66        18,502    6.27        11,577    3.93        
$200 65,672    22.27      128,599  43.61      - -
$250 51,644    17.51      31,556    10.70      197,100  66.83      
$500 159,702  54.15      78,098    26.48      70,567    23.93      
$1,000 10,053    3.41        4,155      1.41        14,537    4.93        
$2,500 - - - - 1,044      0.35        
$5,000 - - - - 92           0.03        
Note: Dash indicates deductible option not available.
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
Table A4: Deductibles
Auto collision Auto comprehensive Home
Standard 
error
Standard 
error
Intercept -0.998 * 0.135 -2.675 * 0.248
Driver 1 age (years) -0.011 * 0.004 0.039 * 0.008
Driver 1 age squared (hundreds of years) 0.013 * 0.003 -0.048 * 0.007
Driver 1 female 0.067 * 0.021 -0.084 * 0.041
Driver 1 married 0.048 0.025 0.125 * 0.046
Driver 1 separated, divorced, or widowed 0.000 0.023 0.058 0.045
Driver 1 insurance score (tens) -0.018 * 0.001 -0.013 * 0.001
Has 2 drivers 0.063 0.123 -0.135 0.214
Has 3+ drivers 0.529 * 0.158 0.058 0.255
Young driver 0.020 0.049 0.019 0.082
Driver 2 age (years) 0.012 * 0.005 0.006 0.009
Driver 2 age squared (hundreds of years) -0.013 * 0.005 -0.002 0.008
Driver 2 female 0.097 * 0.034 -0.064 0.060
Driver 2 married -0.207 * 0.047 -0.121 0.087
Driver 2 separated, divorced, or widowed 0.088 0.164 0.000 0.302
Vehicle 1 age (years) -0.012 0.005 -0.028 * 0.006
Vehicle 1 age squared (hundreds of years) -0.015 0.044 0.143 * 0.036
Vehicle 1 personal use -0.010 0.014 -0.034 0.025
Vehicle 1 passive restraint -0.078 0.062 -0.114 0.102
Vehicle 1 anti-theft 0.011 0.015 0.018 0.027
Vehicle 1 anti-lock brakes 0.026 0.016 0.039 0.030
Has 2 vehicles 0.281 * 0.056 0.689 * 0.095
Has 3+ vehicles 0.293 * 0.107 0.930 * 0.156
Vehicle 2 age (years) -0.023 * 0.003 -0.020 * 0.005
Vehicle 2 age squared (hundreds of years) 0.031 * 0.010 0.019 0.018
Vehicle 2 personal use -0.019 0.015 -0.035 0.027
Vehicle 2 passive restraint 0.075 0.039 -0.033 0.062
Vehicle 2 anti-theft 0.029 0.018 0.009 0.033
Vehicle 2 anti-lock brakes -0.003 0.019 -0.023 0.032
Year dummies
Territory codes
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
Estimate
Table A5: Regression Parameter Estimates - Auto
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
Collision Comprehensive
Estimate
Yes
Notes: Insurance score is based on information contained in credit reports. Territory codes 
indicate rating territories, which are based on actuarial risk factors, such as traffic and weather 
patterns, population demographics, wildlife density, and the cost of goods and services.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Standard 
error
Intercept -1.968 * 0.250
Insurance score (tens) -0.018 * 0.001
Home age (years) 0.003 * 0.001
Home age squared (years) 0.000 0.000
Insured value (tens of thousands of dollars) 0.015 * 0.001
Farm or business 0.098 * 0.047
Primary residence 0.631 * 0.228
Owner occupied 0.121 0.077
Number of families -0.011 0.007
Masonry construction 0.048 0.029
Distance to fire hydrant (feet) 0.001 0.001
Alarm or other protection 0.019 0.036
Year dummies
Territory codes
Protection classes
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
Table A6: Regression Parameter Estimates - Home
Tricoverage Sample (294,917 household-years)
Estimate
Notes: Insurance score is based on information contained in credit 
reports. Territory codes indicate rating territories, which are based on 
actuarial risk factors, such as traffic and weather patterns, population 
demographics, wildlife density, and the cost of goods and services. 
Protection classes gauge the effectiveness of local fire protection and 
building codes.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Estimate Estimate Estimate
Variances:
Auto collision 0.107 0.065 0.149 0.114 0.049 0.180 0.093 0.070 0.116
Auto comprehensive 0.399 0.221 0.577 0.342 0.068 0.616 0.402 0.300 0.505
Home 0.405 0.383 0.428 0.401 0.260 0.541
Covariances:
Auto collision and auto comprehensive 0.137 0.101 0.173 0.123 0.064 0.182 0.131 0.112 0.151
Auto collision and home 0.061 0.022 0.099 0.121 0.081 0.161
Auto comprehensive and home 0.225 0.179 0.271 0.209 0.135 0.282
Correlations:
Auto collision and auto comprehensive 0.663 0.399 0.926 0.622 0.195 1.049 0.680 0.522 0.838
Auto collision and home 0.293 0.099 0.486 0.564 0.298 0.830
Auto comprehensive and home 0.559 0.389 0.729 0.563 0.247 0.880
Table A7: Association Parameter Estimates - Alternative Samples
Tricoverage sample Alternative sample A Alternative sample B
Notes: The tricoverage sample comprises an unbalanced panel of households who purchased all three coverages (auto collision, auto 
comprehensive, and home) in one or more years between 1998 and 2006. Alternative sample A comprises a balanced panel of households who 
purchased all three coverages (auto collision, auto comprehensive, and home). Alternative sample B comprises an unbalanced panel of 
households who purchased both auto coverages (collision and comprehensive).
(62,425 households;               
294,917 household-years)
(8,731 households;                
78,579 household-years)
(203,731 households;            
1,019,170 household-years)
95 percent 
confidence interval
95 percent 
confidence interval
95 percent 
confidence interval
Estimate Estimate Estimate
Variances:
Auto collision 0.107 0.065 0.149 0.094 0.038 0.150 0.108 0.051 0.166
Auto comprehensive 0.399 0.221 0.577 0.337 0.086 0.587 0.450 0.201 0.698
Home 0.405 0.383 0.428 0.388 0.281 0.496 0.246 0.038 0.454
Covariances:
Auto collision and auto comprehensive 0.137 0.101 0.173 0.138 0.085 0.192 0.129 0.081 0.178
Auto collision and home 0.061 0.022 0.099 0.088 0.055 0.120 0.058 0.021 0.094
Auto comprehensive and home 0.225 0.179 0.271 0.224 0.157 0.290 0.217 0.152 0.282
Correlations:
Auto collision and auto comprehensive 0.663 0.399 0.926 0.776 0.300 1.252 0.586 0.272 0.900
Auto collision and home 0.293 0.099 0.486 0.458 0.230 0.686 0.352 0.066 0.639
Auto comprehensive and home 0.559 0.389 0.729 0.619 0.312 0.926 0.652 0.270 1.034
95 percent 
confidence interval
95 percent 
confidence interval
95 percent 
confidence interval
Table A8: Association Parameter Estimates - Low and High Deductible Households
 Tricoverage sample  All deductibles ≤ $250  Any deductible > $250 
(22,072 households;               
120,213 household-years)
(40,353 households;               
174,704 household-years)
(62,425 households;               
294,917 household-years)
Prior Uniline Multiline Prior Uniline Multiline
Deductible choice premiums premiums premiums premiums premiums premiums
$100 2,374 2,389 2,409 1,194 1,273 1,279
$200 0 0 0 0 0 0
$250 34,564 34,723 34,751 29,379 29,428 29,524
$500 24,004 23,872 23,808 30,194 30,018 29,925
$1,000 1,483 1,441 1,457 1,658 1,706 1,697
Policies with change in deductible (percent) - 5.3 6.8 - 5.3 6.8
Aggregate changes in coverage (dollars), gross (absolute value) - 820,750 1,046,450 - 864,850 1,111,950
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), policies with change - 246.99 246.86 - 262.47 261.64
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), all policies - 13.15 16.76 - 13.85 17.81
Prior Uniline Multiline Prior Uniline Multiline
Deductible choice premiums premiums premiums premiums premiums premiums
$50 7 4 4 20 19 21
$100 3,633 3,723 3,633 11,919 12,363 12,829
$200 10,444 10,643 10,822 16,976 16,949 16,862
$250 15,144 15,359 15,636 12,317 12,236 12,024
$500 27,979 27,530 27,276 19,910 19,565 19,371
$1,000 5,218 5,166 5,054 1,283 1,293 1,318
Policies with change in deductible (percent) - 12.4 20.9 - 14.4 25.3
Aggregate changes in coverage (dollars), gross - 1,276,800 2,348,350 - 1,295,500 2,351,000
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), policies with change - 164.47 179.91 - 143.70 148.69
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), all policies - 20.45 37.62 - 20.75 37.66
Prior Uniline Multiline Prior Uniline Multiline
Deductible choice premiums premiums premiums premiums premiums premiums
$100 85 69 70 91 100 98
$250 31,871 32,851 32,993 40,640 40,903 40,975
$500 18,440 17,972 17,847 14,529 14,201 14,122
$1,000 11,632 11,160 11,139 7,085 7,132 7,142
$2,500 318 304 303 64 72 69
$5,000 79 69 73 16 17 19
Policies with change in deductible (percent) - 13.5 14.7 - 11.6 12.8
Aggregate changes in coverage (dollars), gross - 2,902,500 3,187,200 - 2,437,850 2,692,850
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), policies with change - 343.45 347.45 - 335.56 337.49
Per policy change in coverage (dollars), all policies - 46.50 51.06 - 39.05 43.14
Panel C: Home
Expected utility model Probability distortion model
Tricoverage Sample (62,425 policies)
Table A9: Response of Deductible Choices to Experience Rating
Panel A: Auto collision
Expected utility model Probability distortion model
Panel B: Auto comprehensive
Expected utility model Probability distortion model
